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I. Introduction
T HE topic of human well-being is important. It is also one of cross-disciplinary interest. Recent research, across a variety of literatures within the social and medical sciences, has attempted to gauge the satisfaction and happiness of a society by drawing on data on citizens' subjective well-being and measurements of variables such as real income. Such work may eventually have policy implications. 1 The Stiglitz Commission (set up by Nicholas Sarkozy of France and downloadable at www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr) recently completed a report on the issue of how in the future some mixture of economic prosperity and psychological health might be measured and used by governments.
The aim of this paper is to explore the geography of human well-being. It studies mental health and life satisfaction among a recent random sample of 1.3 million U.S. inhabitants. 2 The size of the data set, gathered between 2005 and 2008, provides advantages denied to previous investigators. (The often-used General Social Survey, for example, samples only approximately 3,000 Americans biannually.) We are able to establish some of the first evidence that California, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, and Missouri have relatively low levels of psychological well-being. These six states come within the lowest quartile of (regression-corrected) well-being on two separate measures. Using the same criteria, we show that Louisiana, Washington, D.C., Colorado, Alaska, and Tennessee have relatively high well-being. ( We are including Washington, D.C., in the category of states in this article.)
The paper discusses the implications of these state-bystate patterns and demonstrates that there is no correlation between states' (regression-adjusted) levels of life satisfaction and their levels of GDP per capita. It also checks, and occasionally disagrees with, some of the famous microfindings in earlier U.S. well-being literature. Following Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 2003 , and an emerging literature that includes Clark (2003) , Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2001 Oswald ( , 2003 , Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) , Kahneman et al. (2004) , Layard (2005) , Deaton (2008) , Levinson (2009) , Daly and Wilson (2009) , Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) , and Luechinger (2009) , we view survey well-being data as proxy utility measures. This paper is complementary to, and covers different ground from, new work by Oswald and Wu (2010) , which exploits BRFSS data but uses no mental health information and does not report microeconometric life satisfaction equations.
This paper focuses on four questions:
1. Do some parts of the United States offer higher utility than others? We tackle this by combining information on reported levels of life satisfaction and mental ill health. Our conclusion is, broadly, yes. 2. Are richer states also ''happier'' states? We find not.
When individuals' incomes are held constant, high-GDP states in our data are discernibly less happy. This is what compensating-differentials theory would predict: economists would expect that overall well-being should be the same everywhere (because individuals can be expected to keep moving into attractive places until those are too congested and expensive to be desirable). An arbitrage argument where intrinsically nicer places pay lower wages in equilibrium (see, for example, Roback, 1982; Blomquist, Berger, & Hoehn, 1988; Krupka & Donaldson, 2007) , has an intellectual pedigree going back to Adam Smith. 3. Do life satisfaction regression equations have the same econometric structure as mental health equations? The approximate answer is that they do. Some exceptions, noted later, emerge.
4. How large are the estimated effects on individuals of personal variables such as income, race, and age? There is, in the literature, continuing debate about these variables' roles.
The neoclassical textbook apparatus would suggest a strong connection between money and well-being: greater income allows individuals access to greater resources and hence to higher utility. By contrast, a common view in the psychology literature, well expressed by the review article of Diener and Biswas-Diener (2002) , is that empirically there is only a slight correlation. In the studies those authors describe, the highest correlation between income and subjective well-being that any American research has found is a Pearson's correlation coefficient of r ¼ 0.18.
We try to contribute to this issue. Another debate centers on the connections between aging and well-being. Traditional psychology, represented by sources such as Diener et al. (1999) and Argyle (2001) , argues that happiness is either flat or slightly increasing in age. Some work by economists and others, however, has demonstrated signs of a U-shape through the life cycle. This result appears in Theodossiou (1998) , Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) , Frey and Stutzer (2002) , Clark (2003) , Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) , Graham (2005) , Oswald (1997) , Sacker and Wiggins (2002) , Van Praag and Ferreri-Carbonell (2004) , Shields and Wheatley Price (2005) , Oswald and Powdthavee (2007) , and Propper et al. (2005) .
Use of American data on this issue has not been common. But one approach is that of researchers such as Mroczek and Kolarz (1998) and Easterlin (2006) , who hold constant few or no other influences on well-being and instead look at the uncorrected relationship between happiness and age. In a sense, these authors focus on a reduced-form issue. That issue is a descriptive question: How does observed happiness vary over the life cycle? Further analysis includes that of Mroczek and Spiro (2005) . The authors conclude in a data set on U.S. veterans that happiness rises into the person's approximately early 60s and then tends to fall away. New work by Glenn (2009) also argues, in his criticism of the multicountry study by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) , that there is no U shape in American data.
We examine this issue in BRFSS data. More broadly, our paper is in an intellectual tradition that includes Kahneman (1998), Plaut, Markus, and Lachman (2002) , Gabriel, Mattey, and Wascher (2003) , Propper et al. (2005) , Weich et al. (2005) , Powdthavee (2006) , Moro et al. (2008), and Luechinger (2009) . 3 Propper et al. (2005) and Weich et al. (2005) find little geographical variation in mental health once they control for individuals' microcharacteristics. Our spatial results are broadly compatible with new European analysis, done inde-pendently and with a different statistical method, by Pittau, Zelli, and Gelman (2010) .
II. Conceptual Issues
An old idea in the economics literature is that different regions within a country can be expected to provide the same level of utility to their inhabitants. 4 If Vermont, for example, offers a more attractive level of well-being to representative individual A than does Ohio, then we would expect to see Ohio citizens like individual A try to move to Vermont. That kind of migratory flow will cease only when a receiving region has become less desirable as an area in which to live. The economic equilibrium ought to be one of strict equality of utility (Roback, 1982; Hoehn, Berger, & Blomquist, 1987) . This is a theoretical proposition. It rests on the assumptions of sufficiently low mobility costs and sufficiently accurate levels of information about what it would be like to live in another state. 4 It is also possible that the proposition holds only after a considerable adjustment period (Treyz et al., 1993) . If the economist's arbitrage theory across regions is correct and well-being data are a useful proxy for utility, then its prediction should be detectable in an empirical test for state-by-state equality of well-being for a person of given characteristics.
When might such a test ever be expected to fail? One such circumstance would be after a major change in events or the intrinsic attractiveness of individual states or regions. Then a temporary disequilibrium would be expected.
Conceptually, one possible taxonomy is the following:
A strong version of spatial arbitrage equilibrium. Highincome U.S. states offer lower nonpecuniary utility, and there are no detectable econometric differences in regression-adjusted well-being across states. A weak version of spatial arbitrage equilibrium. Highincome U.S. states offer lower nonpecuniary utility, but there remain some detectable econometric differences in regression-adjusted well-being across U.S. states. A rejection of strong and weak forms.
The evidence of the paper tentatively favors the second of these interpretations. 3 Moriarty et al. (2009) also draw on several waves of the BRFSS data used in this paper to look at geographical patterns in serious mental illness across U.S. states. 4 Technically, the standard arbitrage argument is that the marginal values of some variable X should be equated. Consider a much older world where people can live anywhere in the United States, and wherever they go, they can claim some land for free. Early migrants to California claim the beach properties, so even after some years, average happiness in California is higher than in, say, Idaho. In this case, there can be a difference between the marginal and average citizen's utility because early movers have an advantage. But now assume that, in the modern era, everything is tradable. Hence, even a new migrant to California who has sufficient resources can acquire beach property. Then, controlling for people's characteristics, the ''marginal'' Californians are as happy as all other Californians.
III. Data
We draw on data collected under the auspices of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), a state-based system of health surveys that gathers information on risky behaviors, preventive health practices, and access to health care. The BRFSS was established in 1984 by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); currently data are collected monthly in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. The data set is meant to ''identify emerging health problems, establish and track health objectives, and develop and evaluate public health policies and programs.'' More than 350,000 adults are interviewed each year; the BRFSS is the largest telephone health survey in the world.
We study a sample of respondents between the ages of 18 and 85 with nonmissing information. The data set's annual samples provide statistically representative crosssectional snapshots of the United States. 5 Information on individual life satisfaction was collected in BRFSS for the first time in 2005. Hence there has been little published research on life satisfaction using this data set.
In the remainder of the paper, we rely on two particular survey questions. One provides information about how people feel generally about the quality of their lives; the other gets more narrowly at their mental health. The exact wording of the BRFSS life satisfaction question is: ''In general, how satisfied are you with your life?'' Here people are able to answer one of the following: very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied [questionnaire line code 206]. The wording of the mental health question [questionnaire line code 76] that we use as a complementary source of well-being information is: ''Thinking about your mental health, which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions, for how many days during the past 30 days was your mental health not good?'' In this case, individuals report an integer between 0 and 30.
Within the BRFSS questionnaire, individuals are asked quite early on about their days of poor mental health. Eight pages (of questions) later, they are asked about their household income. Twelve pages after the income question, they are asked about their feelings of satisfaction with their own life.
The paper's evidence is set out in four main tables that give regression equation results in which the dependent variable is derived from the two kinds of survey answers. To give a sense for the raw patterns in the data, life satisfaction in the United States can be treated in a cardinal way by assigning 1 to 4 to the four answers, where ''very satisfied'' is assigned a 4. The mean of life satisfaction in modern U.S. data is then 3.4, with a standard deviation of 0.6. The median number of days of mental ill health is 0, while the mean is 3.4 days in the past month, with a standard deviation of 7.7. Well-being answers are thus skewed, in both kinds of measures, toward the upper end of the possible well-being distribution. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics. Table A2 gives the raw mean values of life satisfaction by state.
IV. Results
Life-satisfaction equations, in which the years 2005 to 2008 are pooled, are set out in table 1. For simplicity, we choose an elementary linear OLS estimator in which the four possible values of the dependent variable are assigned the integers from a high of 4 down to a low of 1. However, the later substantive findings are not altered by switching to an ordered estimator. Table 1 's method allows coefficient sizes to be read off directly as life satisfaction points.
Column 1 of table 1 reveals a monotonic relationship between household income and people's feelings of satisfaction with their lives. The omitted category is a household income under $10,000 per annum. Seven dummy variables are included, for income bands stretching up to ''income greater than $75,000.'' Perhaps unsurprisingly given the sample size, the null of 0 on these coefficients can be rejected at any conventional level (the implied t-statistic on the upperincome banded dummy, for example, exceeds 200).
The size of the income gradient in table 1 is large. There are four ways to think about this. First, if we compare Americans with the lowest levels of income to those with the highest levels, the difference in life satisfaction in column 1 is approximately 0.6 points. To put this in context, only approximately 5% of the sample put themselves in the two lower satisfaction categories (dissatisfied with life; very dissatisfied with life), so a hypothetical change of 0.6 life satisfaction points is to be thought of as a large move. Second, it can be seen from column 2 of table 1 that although racial dummy variables enter with well-determined coefficients, with both black and Native Americans, for example, having coefficients of approximately À0.14, the size of the race effects in the equation is far smaller than that generated by income differences. This is a way of saying that, statistically, there is much more information in the income dummies than in the race dummies. This has not been the standard view (it could be compared to that in Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, or an older psychology literature based on simple bivariate patterns) but it is potentially consistent with the finding of Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) that gender and racial differences in Americans' life satisfaction have declined through recent decades. Third, the contribution to the R 2 from income dummies is many multiples of that from race, age, and gender dummies. Fourth, it will be seen later that the income dummy coefficients correspond to large effects when examined against, for example, major life characteristics like being separated or unemployed.
The R 2 in column 1 of table 1 is 0.077. Column 1 has income entered as a control. By contrast, the R 2 is only 0.008 in column 2 of table 1; this column has only a set of demographic characteristics as controls. Put loosely, therefore, money matters a great deal here. An R 2 of 0.077 corresponds arithmetically to a Pearson r coefficient of 0.28, which can be compared to the standard finding, in devel-oped nations, of around r ¼ 0.15 (pointed out in the review by Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002) .
Columns 3 and 4 of table 1 show that the income gradient of column 1 is only slightly affected by the inclusion of various sets of control variables. Perhaps most striking, there -À0.0450** À0.0385** À0.0532** (0.00428) (0.00437) (0.00434) Hispanic -À0.108** 0.0437** 0.0533** (0.00239) (0.00250) (0.00254) Native American -À0.140** À0.0120** 0.0146** (0.00420) (0.00429) (0.00425) Other minority -À0.0662* À0.0262 À0.0276 continues to be a difference of approximately 0.5 life satisfaction points, even in the long specification of column 4 of table 1, between individuals in the highest income category and those in the lowest income category. This final column includes fifty state dummies, eleven month-of-interview dummies, and an extensive set of personal and demographic dummy variables. Comparing columns 1 and 4, the bivariate association between income and satisfaction is only a little mediated by adjustment for approximately eighty other independent variables.
In these data, there is support for a U shape in life satisfaction throughout most of the life course. 6 Regression adjusted, the age at which minimum life satisfaction is reached is slightly before 50 years old (table A3 in the appendix gives an indication of the shape). An approximate U exists even in raw data. Contrary to the American data in Easterlin (2006) and Glenn (2009) , it is not necessary first to control for endogenous variables such as education or marriage or income.
The other variables in column 4 of table 1 have familiarly signed coefficients. Ceteris paribus, a college degree is associated with 0.1 extra life satisfaction points, marriage when compared to being unmarried with 0.17 points, marital separation with À0.1 points, unemployment with À0.16 points, and self-employment with 0.06 points. Table 2 turns to life satisfaction patterns across the geography of the United States. Here the state dummy coefficients are written out explicitly. Alabama is the omitted, base category. Thus, the first state-dummy coefficient in column 1 of table 2 can be interpreted as showing that satisfaction with life on average in Alaska is 0.0185 life satisfaction points above that in the base case of Alabama. Arizona residents have 0.0494 of extra life satisfaction on this cardinal scale, Arkansas is indistinguishable from Alabama, and so on across the listed states.
However, column 1 of table 2 cannot tell us what life is truly like in each state of the union. Rather, it gives a measure of the average well-being of the typical resident of that state. Because states vary widely in the nature of their inhabitants, a more natural inquiry is to examine the coefficients on state dummies after controlling for personal and demographic features of the populations of each. This is what the later columns of table 2 do.
Arguably the most interesting column of table 2 is the fourth. In column 4, we have adjusted for all the nonfinancial features of individuals. This may appear strange, but there is an important reason not to hold constant people's income in statistical work of this sort. It is that if someone leaves West Virginia to live in California, they are likely to earn a larger nominal salary, but other factors, such as house prices and traffic congestion, will tend to be worse. Hence, if we control in a well-being regression equation for their level of income, the structure of the state dummies in the equation will tell us about the remaining intrinsic state disamenities for which compensating higher pay must be offered. The purpose of the exercise here is instead to understand the net benefits or losses from being a citizen of the state.
How much do life satisfaction levels vary from state to state? The answer is, by some standards, fairly widely. The notably poor life satisfaction states are then, in the third column of table 2, after rounding to two decimal points, California (À0.04), Illinois (À0.03), Indiana (À0.07), Kentucky (À0.06), Massachusetts (À0.05), Michigan (À0.06), Missouri (À0.06), Nebraska (À0.05), New York (À0.06), Ohio (À0.06), Pennsylvania (À0.06), Rhode Island (À0.04), and West Virginia (À0.06). The high-satisfaction states are Washington, D.C. (0.02), Florida (0.02), Hawaii (0.04), and Louisiana (0.05). The standard errors correspond in each case, within table 2, to a test of the null hypothesis of 0 on the coefficient.
One warning is in order. It should not be presumed that there is a statistically significant difference between each of the states within these low-satisfaction and high-satisfaction groupings. The null of well-being equality in Indiana and Kentucky, for example, cannot be rejected.
A final concern is whether key state-level economic variables might be missing from the specifications in tables 1 and 2. Following a referee's suggestion, we checked the consequences of including the state unemployment rate, which is somewhat in the spirit of Di Tella et al. (2001), and the population density in the state, in the spirit of Cramer, Torgersen, and Kringlen (2004) . Neither of these produced a material alteration in the structure of the state dummies in a life satisfaction equation; typically the two sets of state dummy structures were correlated 0.99. An example table, for unemployment, is given in table A4 in the appendix.
Tables 3 and 4 present equivalent results. In these cases, however, we switch to a dependent variable that measures mental ill health. This is the number of days, in the past 30 days, that people feel they suffered from poor mental health. 7 The median answer is 0, and by the nature of the data, it is not possible for those with good mental health to distinguish themselves from those with sound mental health. For this reason, we use a tobit estimator, but the results are not sensitive to this choice. The first thing noticeable in column 1 of table 3 is the strong income The age structure in these mental health equations is qualitatively consistent with that found in the earlier life satisfaction specifications. There is now a hill-shaped relationship between mental ill-being and age (not reported); these turn at around the mid-30s, so at slightly younger ages than in table 1. Other variables enter in qualitatively predictable ways. For example, unemployment is associated with 3 extra days of poor mental health, a college degree with 1.5 fewer days, and marital separation with 4 extra days.
With a few notable exceptions, there is much agreement between the qualitative structure of these American life satisfaction and mental distress equations. A natural comparison is between column 4 of table 1 and column 4 of table 3. The main differences in the coefficient sizes are for Asian, Native American, female, and student. Most variables enter with equivalent effects for each of the two kinds of dependent variable. This finding is against the spirit of Huppert and Whittington's (2003) argument that positive and negative affect are strongly different in character. Table 4 moves to regressions showing the state-by-state pattern in the number of days of poor mental health. The stand-out case in column 4 of table 4 is California, with the worst mental health across the U.S. states (a coefficient of 0.567). The best mental health, that is, states with the fewest number of poor mental health days, is found in Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, the two Dakotas, and Tennessee. Another method is to examine which states are found in the lowest (and highest) quartiles on both measures-the life satisfaction scores and the mental-distress-days scores. Doing so yields the following list of states in the lowest quartile of well-being on both measures: California, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, and Missouri.
The states in the highest quartile of well-being on both measures are Louisiana, Washington, D.C., Alaska, Tennessee, and Colorado.
How else might these two forms of well-being measure be combined? Figures 1 to 4 set out various checks and sug-gest that the two kinds are here, as might be expected, providing reinforcing information. Satisfied U.S. states are noticeably also the mentally healthy ones. To our knowledge, this result is a new one.
A final issue that deserves consideration is whether the stark results on the states of California (with poor mental health) and Louisiana (with high well-being overall) are caused by the later years in this sample of four years. Might it be, say, that the credit crunch that hit California by [2007] [2008] or the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana in the latter part of 2005 somehow led to extreme values in those state dummies? To check this, we reran the key regressions equations for the early year of 2005 data alone. The results for California and Louisiana, for example, were almost identical to those in the full sample. Hence, cru- Each dot is a state. The correlation is significant at 1% on a two-tailed test. This figure plots state dummy coefficients from a life satisfaction equation against state dummy coefficients from a number of mental-distress-days equation. In each equation, the regression controls only for year dummies and month-of-interview dummies. Life satisfaction is coded for each individual from 4 (very satisfied) to 1 (very dissatisfied). Mental distress days are coded from 0 (no days) up to 30 (every day in the last month). The bottom right-hand observation is Kentucky. Question wordings in the BRFSS questionnaire are: ''Now thinking about your mental health, which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions, for how many days during the past 30 days was your mental health not good?'' (questions 76-77) and ''In general, how satisfied are you with your life?'' (question 206), with answers coded from 1 to 4. cially, the patterns documented in this paper are not merely the product of the last year or two of data.
As a final and important check that there is not some fundamental problem with the mental health data in BRFSS, Figure 7 reveals a reassuringly similar state pattern, for the interesting case of young people (these other data are necessarily regression uncorrected but that should be less impor-tant among nonworking young people), from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health.
These differences in well-being across states are not minor. In cardinalized terms, they correspond to up to 0.2 life satisfaction points, which is similar in size to the ceteris paribus cross-sectional effect of marital separation or unemployment. 8 The economist's natural null hypothesis of equality of well-being across areas is, in its strict version, rejected by the data. Interestingly, it is not different states' material riches that determine their position in this spatial well-being ordering. Figure 5 illustrates that fact. There exists no statistically significant correlation, although a best-fitting line would have a very small positive gradient, between state wellbeing and state GDP per capita. By contrast, and conceptually a different form of comparison, Figure 6 shows that if we control for household income (the microequations are not given in the tables but are available on request), then this gradient is negative. (This result is potentially consistent with the fixed-effects relative income concern finding in Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, and Luttmer, 2005. Ours, however, is naturally thought of as a correlation between the state fixed effects and other characteristics. Figure 7 is a variant and corroborative check.) This, in a weaker version, is what compensating differentials theory would predict. It should be emphasized that the paper's results do not merely tell us the obvious fact that factors like the climate or air cleanliness or beauty are better in some places than in others. The intellectual question is why the plusses and minuses from innate state differences, such 8 To get to 0.2, we are comparing between the happiest and least happy states, to get an approximate idea of the range within the United States. as perhaps sunshine hours or beautiful lakes, are not entirely eroded-right back up to the point where all areas provide the same net utility. Even after adjusting for individuals' backgrounds and characteristics, there remain some significant unexplained differences state by state in Ameri-cans' well-being. 9 Future work may have to address this apparent puzzle.
V. Conclusions
This paper examines information on 1.3 million randomly sampled U.S. citizens for the years 2005 to 2008. It uses data on life satisfaction scores and on people's recorded numbers of days in poor mental health. Some states exhibit low levels of mental well-being, while relatively high levels are found among others. Particularly notable in the data is, for example, the unusually happy state of Louisiana. 10 In contrast, and against some common perceptions, Californians are not happier than the inhabitants of other states (consistent with the data on college students studied in Schkade & Kahneman, 1998) . In fact, we show that they lie below the mental well-being of people living in the majority of places in the United States.
Importantly, these BRFSS data reveal (see especially figure  5 ) no correlation between U.S. states' mental well-being and their GDP per capita. Correcting for people's incomes, satisfaction with life is low in the rich states. Our results are thus consistent with a weak version of the arbitrage theory that Each dot is a state. The correlation is significant at 1% on a two-tailed test. Washington, D.C., is omitted (for compositional reasons, its GDP per head is hard to compare with that of other states). GDP data are for 2007 and are from the standard Bureau of Economic Analysis source. In fully adjusted data, there are regression controls for household income as well as the survey respondent's gender, age, age squared, education, marital status, unemployment, and race, and also year dummies and month-of-interview dummies. Each dot is a state. Washington, D.C., is omitted (for compositional reasons, its GDP per head is hard to compare with that of other states). GDP data are for 2007 and are from the standard Bureau of Economic Analysis source. Pearson's r here is positive but below 0.1. In adjusted data, there are regression controls for the survey respondent's gender, age, age squared, education, marital status, unemployment, and race, and also year dummies and month-of-interview dummies. 9 Pittau et al. (2010) find something similar. In current work, we are exploring ideas from Putnam (2000) . 10 Because we were initially surprised to find Louisiana doing so well in these rankings, we checked for any corroborative evidence in the psychiatric literature. We discovered that Louisianan adolescent mental areas should in equilibrium provide equal utility across space. Unlike informal quality-of-life rankings of the U.S. states (such as Rampell, 2009 , or Thompson Healthcare, 2007 , which primarily reveal the types of individuals who live in a place, and produce rather different rankings from ours, this paper adjusts for the nature of the citizens in the state.
Although, for completeness, we present a variety of regression-equation specifications, perhaps the most natural ones to focus on are those in the final columns of tables 2 and 4. These specifications control for the detailed demographic backgrounds of individuals but not for their incomes. 11 This is because a principal aim of the paper is to inquire into the overall well-being, not an income-held-constant level of utility, that is provided in a geographical area. 12 There is empirical support for a far stronger income gradient than promulgated in the psychology literature. This result is in the same spirit as the argument of Deaton (2008) on international cross-section data (see also Kapteyn, Smith, & Soest, 2008) . It might seem natural for economists to expect a powerful connection between income and happiness, but a recent review of the evidence in the psychology literature, for example, argues: ''Within most economically developed nations, richer people are only slightly happier than most others'' (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002) . Our empirical results for individuals in the United States do not greatly accord with this view. But they do agree with such a view, or an even stronger version of it, for the states themselves.
Whether there are intellectual connections between the lack of a correlation in figure 5 and the famous Easterlin paradox (1974 Easterlin paradox ( , 2003 remains to be understood, and, importantly, the observed patterns in U.S. state-by-U.S. state well-being demand an explanation. 
Variables
(1) (2) Self-employed 0.0713** 0.0713** (0.00187) (0.00187) Unemployed À0.239** À0.239** (0.00272) (0.00272) Homemaker 0.0508** 0.0508** (0.00208) (0.00208) Student 0.0261** 0.0261** (0.00418) (0.00418) Retired 0.0698** 0.0698** (0.00181) (0.00181) Alaska 0.0201** 0.0253** (0.00775) (0.00853) Arizona 0.0110 0.0122 (0.00631) (0.00636) Arkansas À0.0203** À0.0180** (0.00612) (0.00632) California À0.0363** À0.0322** (0.00587) (0.00649) Colorado 0.00415 0.00510 (0.00557) (0.00561) Connecticut À0.0288** À0.0270** (0.00587) (0.00599) Delaware 0.00798 0.00775 (0.00659) (0.00659) District of Columbia 0.0258** 0.0304** (0.00677) (0.00746) Florida 0.0170** 0.0178** (0.00505) (0.00507) Georgia 0.000930 0.00333 (0.00583) (0.00606) Hawaii 0.0404** 0.0381** (0.00661) (0.00681) Idaho À0.0216** À0.0226** (0.00618) (0.00621) Illinois À0.0328** À0.0295** (0.00619) (0.00659) Indiana À0.0648** À0.0623** (0.00607) (0.00630) Iowa À0.0261** À0.0262** (0.00614) (0.00614) Kansas À0.0306** À0.0296** (0.00557) (0.00562) Kentucky À0.0635** À0.0593** (0.00585) (0.00653) Louisiana 0.0486** 0.0486** (0.00605) (0.00605) Maine À0.0101 À0.00823 (0.00615) (0.00627) Maryland À0.0119* À0.0120* (0.00554) (0.00554) Massachusetts À0.0374** À0.0357** (0.00511) (0.00524) Michigan À0.0533** À0.0465** (0.00556) (0.00725) Minnesota À0.00447 À0.00347 (0.00656) (0.00660) Mississippi À0.00700 À0.00132 (0.00585) (0.00701) Missouri À0.0594** À0.0568** (0.00621) (0.00647) 
Montana À0.0109 À0.0115 (0.00603) (0.00605) Nebraska À0.0469** À0.0485** (0.00536) (0.00548) Nevada À0.0278** À0.0255** (0.00682) (0.00700) New Hampshire À0.0108 À0.0118* (0.00597) (0.00600) New Jersey À0.0295** À0.0282** (0.00536) (0.00543) New Mexico À0.0120* À0.0115 (0.00603) (0.00603) New York À0.0534** À0.0514** (0.00585) (0.00600) North Carolina À0.00290 À0.000161 (0.00506) (0.00539) North Dakota À0.0253** À0.0270** (0.00638) (0.00649) Ohio À0.0546** À0.0505** (0.00549) (0.00615) Oklahoma À0.0300** À0.0296** (0.00558) (0.00559) Oregon À0.0329** À0.0290** (0.00589) (0.00646) Pennsylvania À0.0591** À0.0573** (0.00520) (0.00533) Rhode Island À0.0337** À0.0299** (0.00650) (0.00699) South Carolina 0.0139* 0.0188** (0.00546) (0.00637) South Dakota À0.0208** À0.0228** (0.00584) (0.00599) Tennessee 0.00489 0.00816 (0.00631) (0.00669) Texas 0.00383 0.00547 (0.00545) (0.00556) Utah À0.0152* À0.0167** (0.00620) (0.00629) Vermont À0.00971 À0.00993 (0.00583) (0.00583) Virginia 0.00108 À0.000286 (0.00610) (0.00617) Washington À0.0248** À0.0225** (0.00488) (0.00513) West Virginia À0.0590** À0.0578** (0.00662) (0.00666) Wisconsin À0.0246** À0.0233** (0.00601) (0 Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. All regressions include controls for month and year of survey, and five-year age bands. Life satisfaction is measured on a 1-4 scale: 1 ¼ very dissatisfied to 4 ¼ very satisfied.
